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ABSTRACT: There is a strong tendency in science to opt for simpler and more unified hypotheses. A view that has of-
ten been voiced is that such qualities, though aesthetically pleasing or beautiful, are at best pragmatic considera-
tions in matters of choosing between rival hypotheses. This essay offers a novel conception and an associated 
measure of unification, both of which are manifestly more than just pragmatic considerations. The discussion 
commences with a brief survey of some failed attempts to conceptualise unification. It then proceeds to an 
analysis of the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness, as these are essential ingredients 
in the proposed conception of unification and its associated measure. Roughly speaking, the notions attempt to 
capture the way support flows or fails to flow between the content parts of a hypothesis. Equally roughly, the 
more the content of a hypothesis is confirmationally connected, i.e. support flows between its content parts, 
the more that content is unified. Since the confirmational connectedness of two content parts is determined by 
purely objective matters of fact, the proposed notion and measure of unification are themselves strictly objec-
tive, i.e. not merely pragmatic. The essay concludes with a discussion of how the proposed measure handles sev-
eral examples but also how it relates to the debate over measures of coherence.
Keywords: Unification, confirmation theory, objective probabilities, ad hoc, relevant deduction, holism and coherence.
RESUMEN: En la ciencia hay una marcada tendencia a preferir las hipótesis más simples y unificadas. Una opinión man-
tenida a menudo es que tales cualidades, aun siendo atractivas o estéticamente satisfactorias, constituyen con-
sideraciones pragmáticas, a lo sumo, en el asunto de la elección entre teorías rivales. Este ensayo ofrece una 
concepción novedosa de unificación y una medida asociada a ella, ambas claramente algo más que meras consi-
deraciones pragmáticas. La discusión comienza con un breve repaso de algunos intentos fallidos de conceptua-
lizar la unificación. Después se analizan las nociones de conexión y desconexión confirmacional, componentes 
esenciales en la noción de unificación y la medida asociada que aquí se proponen. Dicho brevemente, esas no-
ciones pretenden captar el modo en que el apoyo discurre o no entre las partes del contenido de las hipótesis. 
Simplificando, cuanto más conectado confirmacionalmente está el contenido de una hipótesis, más unificado 
está. Dado que la conectividad confirmacional de dos partes del contenido está determinada por cuestiones de 
hecho objetivas, la noción y la medida que propongo son también estrictamente objetivas, esto es, su valor no es 
meramente pragmático. El ensayo concluye con una discusión sobre cómo la medida propuesta afronta diversos 
ejemplos y sobre su relación con el debate sobre las diferentes medidas de coherencia.
Palabras clave: Unificación, teoría de la confirmación, probabilidades objetivas, ad hoc, deducción, holismo y coherencia
1. Introduction
We often hear that simplicity and unification, though aesthetically pleasing or beautiful 
qualities for a hypothesis to possess, are at best pragmatic considerations when deciding be-
tween rival hypotheses. This essay proposes a novel conception and an associated measure 
of unification. In short, the degree to which the content of a hypothesis is unified gets re-
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flected in the extent to which, roughly speaking, its content parts are confirmationally con-
nected. Since such connections are settled by purely objective matters of fact, the proposed 
conception and measure of unification turn out to be objective, and hence not merely prag-
matic, considerations we can appeal to when faced with the prospect of selecting between 
competing hypotheses. The structure of the essay is as follows: Section 2 contains a brief sur-
vey of some prominent but failed attempts to conceptualise unification. Section 3 offers an 
informal introduction to the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness. 
To give a rough idea, the two notions attempt to capture the way support flows or fails to 
flow between the content parts of a hypothesis or, equivalently, between the contents of two 
or more hypotheses. Confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness are given formal 
expositions in Section 4. Section 5 then puts forth a measure for the so-called ‘monstrousness’ 
of a hypothesis. This sets up the proposed measure of unification, explicated in Section 6, 
which is roughly the inverse of a variant of the monstrousness measure. A discussion of how 
the proposed measure handles various cases ensues. Section 7 delves into a hefty difficulty fac-
ing the current proposal, namely practicability. Finally, the last section explores in passing the 
relations between the proposed measure of unification and measures of coherence.
2. Unification: A Brief Overview
Attempts to devise a satisfactory conception of unification abound. One of the earliest to 
have left an indelible mark in the literature is Friedman (1974) where it is argued that an 
intimate connection exists between explanation, understanding and unification. To be pre-
cise, Friedman argues that an adequate theory of explanation must show how explanation 
generates understanding. In his view, understanding is generated when we trim down the 
number of independently acceptable law-like assumptions that feature as explanantia in 
the derivation of an explanandum. The lower that number the more unified an explana-
tion. Friedman’s account is in great part motivated by a desire to avoid a problem with the 
deductive-nomological (DN) account of explanation identified in Hempel and Oppen-
heim (1948). According to the problem of trivial explanations, deriving an explanandum 
from one or more laws, as the DN account dictates, is not sufficient to turn those premises 
into a genuine explanation since we can derive any statement, and hence any law, from it-
self. Friedman seeks to avoid this problem by limiting the derivations that yield genuine ex-
planations to those that unify phenomena. To give one of his examples, the kinetic theory 
of gases unifies (and therefore explains) phenomena that previously fell under the distinct 
explanatory spheres of the Boyle-Charles law, Graham’s law and the assumption that gases 
have certain specific heat capacities because we now need one, instead of three, independ-
ently acceptable law-like assumption(s).
Though highly influential, Friedman’s account was beleaguered from the onset. In a 
well-known contribution, Kitcher (1976) argues that Friedman is only successful in rul-
ing out trivial explanations at the expense of also ruling out some genuine ones. That is, 
there are genuine scientific explanations that do not satisfy all the conditions of Fried-
man’s account. One such condition is that only K-atomic statements explain. A statement 
S is K-atomic if it is not logically equivalent to the conjunction of n ≥ 2 law-like statements 
that are acceptable independently of S. And a statement is independently acceptable to an-
other statement when evidence adequate for accepting the former is inadequate for accept-
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ing the latter. Kitcher cites the (genuine) explanation of the law of adiabatic expansion of 
ideal gases by the conjunction of the first law of thermodynamics and the Boyle-Charles 
law as a counter-example. Each conjunct can be accepted independently of the conjunction 
and thus the conjunction is not K-atomic. Another (related) objection is due to Salmon 
(1998). He points out that no fundamental law statements seem to qualify as K-atomic 
and utilises Newton’s law of universal gravitation as an example. This law can be split up 
into three law-like statements: the first ranging over pairs of masses of astronomical dimen-
sions, the second ranging over pairs of masses where one member is astronomical in its di-
mensions and the other non-astronomical (i.e. smaller) and the third ranging over pairs of 
masses where both members are of non-astronomical dimensions. Presumably, each such 
statement is independently acceptable. Moreover, as Salmon is quick to highlight, this 
treatment seems generalisable: “[i]t seems possible to partition virtually any universal state-
ment into two or more independently acceptable generalizations” (p. 70).
Kitcher is not only a detractor of some of Friedman’s ideas but also an exponent of others. 
This is no more clearly evident than in Kitcher (1989). For a start, Kitcher there agrees with 
Friedman that explanation and unification are intimately connected. Moreover, he sees eye to 
eye with him on the vital role derivation plays in providing successful explanations. What is a 
successful explanation for Kitcher? Roughly speaking, it is a derivation drawn from what he 
calls the ‘explanatory store’ E(K), where K is a set of statements underwritten by the scientific 
community at a particular time. A little more precisely, E(K) is “the set of derivations that 
best systematizes K... the criterion for systematization [being] unification. E(K), then, is the 
set of derivations that best unifies K” (p. 431). How are we meant to understand unification 
here? To unify, Kitcher appears to be telling us, is to “minimiz[e] the number of patterns of 
derivation employed and maximiz[e] the number of conclusions generated” (p. 432).
Schurz and Lambert (1994) object that by conceiving of unification as a form of ‘de-
ductive systematization’, Kitcher (but also Friedman) misses out on “interesting cases [in] 
science” (p. 73). What they have in mind are cases where the systematization is, broadly 
construed, inductive. Schurz and Lambert also indicate that Kitcher’s solution to the prob-
lem of ‘spurious explanations’ is not restrictive enough. To put things in perspective, sup-
pose that a spurious explanation is, simplistically speaking, one that merely postulates a 
deductive relation H → E between H a given hypothesis and E some empirically true state-
ment. Kitcher attempts to rule out such explanations by barring argument patterns where 
what is being derived is substitutable by any statement whatsoever. With this approach, for 
example, he manages to eliminate argument patterns of the form “God wants P, and what-
ever God wants is the case, therefore: P” (1981, pp. 527f). His solution is not, however, 
general enough as it does not apply to cases where the content of P is internally restricted 
by the spurious theory in question, e.g. when our theory about God specifies that P con-
cerns only weather patterns (Schurz and Lambert 1994, 115, f22).
The final approach to unification I will be mentioning can be found in the Schurz and 
Lambert essay. Following in Friedman’s footsteps, the two authors uphold the view that 
the concepts of understanding, unification and explanation are closely related. For simplic-
ity, we here restrict our attention to their account of the first two concepts. Loosely speak-
ing, to understand a phenomenon is “to know how [a statement of that phenomenon] fits 
into one’s background knowledge” or, as Schurz and Lambert prefer to call it, “cognitive 
corpus C” (p. 66). The cognitive corpus C of a subject S consists of S’s state of knowledge 
and belief. More precisely, it consists of a pair <K, I>, where K is a set of declarative sen-
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tences known/believed by S and I is a set of inferences mastered by S. The key notion of fit-
ting deserves closer inspection. According to Schurz and Lambert, a subject fits statements 
of phenomena into their cognitive corpus by inferentially connecting them with parts of 
that corpus such that the latter’s unification increases. The inferential connections at stake 
are conceived of as “argument[s] ibs (in the broad sense)” (p. 71). How broad this category 
of arguments is meant to be is not immediately clear from the discussion but the general 
idea is that the said arguments are not merely deductive, as in the case of Friedman’s and 
Kitcher’s projects, but must also include some sufficiently strong inductive ones.1 What ex-
actly does it mean for there to be an increase in the unification of a given cognitive corpus? 
There’s no quick and easy way to answer this question but, to give the reader a sketch, the 
idea is that on the basis of certain weight assignments and rules one can calculate the costs 
and gains of shifting from a cognitive corpus C not fitted with a statement P to a modi-
fied version C* that is so fitted. If the overall result of this calculation is a positive/nega-
tive number then C* is more/less unified than C. Otherwise, the two corpuses are equally 
unified. As an example, consider one of the addition rules provided (1994, pp. 79-80). The 
addition of a hypothesis to (what they identify as the base of) a cognitive corpus has a cer-
tain intrinsic cost since, intuitively, adding theoretical information to our cognitive cor-
pus complicates its content. Having said this, a good hypothesis may at the same time bring 
with it an extrinsic gain if it allows for the systematization of correct or accurate data. The 
implication being that in such cases the extrinsic gain outweighs the cost and hence the re-
sulting corpus is more unified than the original one.
The main disadvantage of this approach, as I see it, is that it is only as good as (a) the ex-
act characterisation of the class of ibs arguments, (b) the weight assignments we make and (c) 
the rules for calculating costs and gains. So much is up for grabs that calculating the costs and 
gains of a shift from one corpus to another remains a strongly subjective matter. Sure, Schurz 
and Lambert provide some guidance regarding (a) and (b), but nowhere near enough to se-
cure their account against relatively obvious objections. Take the aforementioned rule. Al-
though we are told that the addition of a hypothesis that systematizes many data (and indeed 
correctly predicts new data) brings with it a net gain, it is unclear how much data needs to be 
systematized in order to tip the balance toward such a gain.
3. Disconnectedness: A First Glance
While they ultimately fail, the above accounts do at least get one fundamental thing right. 
By emphasising the role of the acceptability of law-like assumptions in the case of Friedman, 
of the endorsement of a set of statements K by the scientific community at a given time 
in the case of Kitcher, and of the systematization of correct or accurate data in the case of 
1 As Schurz and Lambert note: “In probabilistic terms, this means that the probability (degree of belief) 
of Con [the conclusion of such an argument] is increased by Prem [its premises] to a ‘sufficiently’ great 
value. This probabilistic characterization figures only as an intuitively necessary condition for being a 
correct argument ibs... Since it is doubtful that a sufficient condition for correct arguments ibs can be 
given in general, we will specify a list of the kinds of correct arguments ibs, including deductive, approx-
imative-deductive and inductive arguments, which extensionally defines the correctness of an argument 
ibs” (p. 71) [original emphasis].
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Schurz and Lambert, these accounts place a premium on the link between unification and 
confirmation.2 The account to be unveiled in the sections that follow is in tune with this 
appraisal and indeed elevates the link with confirmation to the single most important in-
gredient in our quest to understand unification. According to this account, unification is 
to be understood as a measure of confirmational connectedness. But what is confirmational 
connectedness and its opposite confirmational disconnectedness? To understand these no-
tions we need to take a rather long detour into another very important topic, namely the 
thorny topic of ad hoc hypotheses.
What makes a hypothesis ad hoc has been the subject of great controversy over the 
years. The account that follows does not aim to do justice to the notion of ad hoc-ness as 
it is used in the scientific literature. No single account can do that for the simple reason 
that the notion has not been used univocally (see Holton 1969, p. 178). A more manage-
able undertaking involves the provision of an account of some features that are common 
to ad hoc hypotheses. Such an undertaking can be found in Votsis (forthcoming). There 
the aim is to articulate one undesirable feature often associated with ad hoc hypotheses, 
namely what can best be described as the artificial or contrived nature of the content of 
those hypotheses. In what follows, I rehearse, and expand on, the main ideas behind this 
account.
Let us call this undesirable characteristic the ‘monstrousness’ of a hypothesis. It indi-
cates the extent to which a hypothesis is compiled out of confirmationally disconnected 
parts, much like the monster in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is compiled out of miscellane-
ous ill-fitting parts. Equivalently, it indicates the extent to which two or more hypotheses 
are confirmationally disconnected. More technical details can be found in the next section. 
For now let us try to flesh out the ideas of monstrousness and confirmational disconnect-
edness with two toy examples, their main virtue being that they are fairly straightforward 
to understand.
In some cases, confirmational disconnectedness and therefore monstrousness follows 
from the fact that even though different parts of a single hypothesis are confirmed, well-
confirmed or even true, the said parts are nonetheless confirmationally unrelated. That 
is, the support each receives does not affect the other parts. Consider an example adapted 
from Goodman (1983). Take the true proposition ‘8497 is not a prime number and the 
other side of the moon is not flat and Elizabeth the First was crowned on a Sunday’.3 Con-
firming any one of these conjuncts presumably has nothing to do with confirming any of 
the others. Thus, having confirmed, well-confirmed, or even true parts is not sufficient 
for confirmational connectedness. An unqualifiedly true hypothesis like the above may be 
highly confirmationally disconnected and hence monstrous.
2 Schurz and Lambert are more explicit about this link than Friedman and Kitcher. They insist that “sci-
entific unification must yield empirical confirmation” (p. 73). The rationale for this demand is given a 
few sentences earlier: “The appeal to reality in the search for unification prevents artificial unification; 
science can’t produce more unification than really exists in the world” (p. 73). This is an extremely im-
portant point that I also subscribe to!
3 The original version of the proposition is offered by Goodman as an example of a contrived hypothesis: 
“8497 is a prime number and the other side of the moon is flat and Elizabeth the First was crowned on 
a Tuesday” (p. 69). All three conjuncts in this version are in fact false.
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In other cases confirmational disconnectedness and monstrousness follows from the 
fact that some parts of a hypothesis cannot be supported altogether. As an example, con-
sider the false proposition ‘The moon’s escape velocity is 2.38km/s and the other side 
of the moon is flat’. The first conjunct enjoys quite a bit of support and is validated, 
among other things, by the successful return of the crews from the six manned moon-
landing missions. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that this is genuine support. As-
sume moreover, as it seems to be the case, that the second conjunct cannot be supported. 
Since, in my view, the question of whether two hypotheses or hypothesis-parts are con-
firmationally disconnected depends entirely on facts about the universe, if such facts 
leave one hypothesis or hypothesis-part entirely without support, then that hypothesis or 
hypothesis-part could not be confirmationally connected to the other. That is to say, the 
two hypotheses or hypothesis-parts must be confirmationally disconnected. Note that 
this point holds also in cases where both hypotheses or hypothesis-parts are entirely de-
void of support. It cannot be stressed enough that the determination of confirmational 
(dis-/)connectedness is not an a priori matter in the view being proposed but rather an 
empirical one that depends entirely on facts about the universe, namely those same facts 
that we cite as supporting a given hypothesis.
4. (Dis-/)connectedness: A Formal Look
Let us use ‘x ๹r y’ to denote that y is a relevant deductive consequence of x – more on this no-
tion below. Confirmational disconnectedness can be articulated thus:4
Any two content parts of a non-self-contradictory proposition Γ expressed as propo-
sitions A, B are confirmationally disconnected if, and only if, for all pairs of internally non-
superfluous propositions α, β where A ๹r α and B ๹r β: (i) there is no true or partly true 
proposition γ such that α ๹r γ and β ๹r γ and (ii) where 0 < P(α), P(β) < 1, P(α/β) = P(α) 
and (iii) there is no atomic proposition δ such that α ∧ β ๹r δ, α ๿r δ and β ๿r δ.
And so connectedness can be articulated thus:
Any two content parts of a non-self-contradictory proposition Γ expressed as propositions 
A, B are confirmationally connected if, and only if, for some pair of internally non-superflu-
ous propositions α, β where A ๹r α and B ๹r β: either (1) there is a true or partly true proposi-
tion γ such that α ๹r γ and β ๹r γ, or (2) where 0 < P(α), P(β) < 1, P(α/β) ≠ P(α) or (3) there 
is at least one atomic proposition δ such that α ∧ β ๹r δ, α ๿r δ and β ๿r δ.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the notion of disconnectedness, though, muta-
tis mutandis, the same analysis can be given for the converse notion of connectedness. Let us 
consider each of the notions appearing in the analysans. First off, what is a content part? To 
fully make sense of the answer I am about to give requires comprehension of the concept of 
relevant deductive consequence. That concept is explicated a few paragraphs below so I ask 
4 I first proposed a version of these notions in Votsis (2014).
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the reader to be patient. For now, suffice it to say that a proposition c is a (non-trivial) content 
part of a proposition Γ if, and only if, Γ ๹r c and c ๿r Γ. In more colloquial terms, c is a (non-
trivial) consequence of Γ but not vice-versa and hence c has strictly less content than Γ.
Next up, consider the non-superfluous-ness clause. As the name suggests, this is incor-
porated into the definition to remove superfluous or redundant content and thus to re-
duce the complexity of the evaluation. Formally, a proposition ν is non-superfluous just in 
case if its content is expressible as a conjunction, there is no conjunct of that conjunction 
the removal of which yields a proposition τ such that ν and τ are logically equivalent.5 In 
other words, ν is non-superfluous if, and only if, none of its content parts are duplicated. 
The simplest case of such duplication is through iterated conjuncts, e.g. α ∧ α. Take propo-
sition κ: α ∧ α. Removal of one conjunct yields another proposition κ': α. Since κ and κ' are 
logically equivalent that makes κ superfluous. A point that needs clarifying is that the non-
superfluous-ness clause is meant to apply to the content of α and of β but not to the joint 
content of those propositions, i.e. to α ∧ β. That is, the clause prohibits content duplication 
only within each proposition, i.e. within α and within β, but not across these propositions, 
i.e. between α and β. That’s why we insist on the characterisation ‘internally non-superflu-
ous’. Thus, the contents of α and β are allowed to overlap. We permit this kind of duplica-
tion across a pair α,β because it allows us to detect one kind of confirmational connection.
Now consider clause (i). To get a better grip on this clause consider first a version 
where the notion of relevant deductive consequence is replaced with the notion of (nor-
mal) deductive consequence. That is, suppose that the clause demands that there is no 
proposition γ such that α ๹ γ and β ๹ γ. It should be clear that if there were such a proposi-
tion γ, α and β would have some common content and hence any confirmation of that con-
tent would confirm at least a content part of α and at least a content part of β. So, if there 
were such a proposition γ, we would have to accept that α and β and hence A and B have 
some sort of confirmational connection. That’s why the first clause (of confirmational dis-
connectedness) demands that there is no such proposition γ.
Why employ a version of the clause that utilises the notion of relevant deductive con-
sequence instead of (normal) deductive consequence? Because there is a fatal flaw with the 
latter. Whatever the content inherent in two propositions α, β, one can always deduce a 
proposition that is common to both, e.g. α ∨ β or a tautology. Such trivial consequences 
are a well-known feature of classical logic. So, were we to stick to the normal deductive en-
tailment formulation of clause (i) we would guarantee the existence of a proposition γ that 
meets the expressed condition. But that would in effect mean that all pairs of propositions 
α, β are connected thereby rendering the concept of disconnectedness unsatisfiable. Ban-
ning such trivial deductive consequences is thus of paramount importance. That’s why the 
notion of relevant deductive consequence is called upon. Its purpose is to home in on the 
non-trivial content of a proposition by ruling out its trivial content as irrelevant.
We say that a conclusion or consequence of “a valid deduction is relevant iff no subfor-
mula of the conclusion is replaceable on some of its occurrences by any other formula salva 
validitate of the deduction” (Schurz 1991, p. 391). Thus, a conclusion or consequence of 
a valid deduction is irrelevant if, and only if, it contains a subformula whose substitution 
5 In other words, if a proposition ν is non-superfluous then the resulting τ is logically weaker than ν. On 
a different note, it is worth pondering whether a stronger form of equivalence is required in the defini-
tion just given.
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on some of its occurrences by any other formula maintains the validity of the deduction.6 
Otherwise put, a deductive consequence is relevant if, and only if, it is not irrelevant. A few 
examples are in order. Suppose we deduce α ∨ β from α. Is α ∨ β a relevant consequence of 
α? No! For α ∨ x where x stands for any other formula whatsoever still classically follows 
from α. The same holds with a bunch of other classically derivable consequences of propo-
sitions that are widely deemed to be undesirable in the context of confirmation including: 
(D1) p → q ๹ (p ∧ r) → q, (D2) p ๹ q → p and (D3) (p ∧ q) → r ๹ (p → r) ∨ (q → r) where 
the replaceable formulae are in bold. Note that derivations like D1 are undesirable because 
they help underwrite cases that involve the tacking (by conjunction) paradox – in short, 
that tacking, i.e. affixing, any irrelevant conjunct to a hypothesis confirmed by some evi-
dence absurdly leads to that conjunct’s confirmation. And derivations like D2 are unde-
sirable because they help underwrite cases that involve spurious explanations. Derivations 
like D3 are undesirable for reasons that will become apparent in our discussion of clause 
(iii) below. On the positive side of the above definition, note that various classically de-
rivable consequences that are deemed desirable in the context of confirmation qualify as 
relevant consequences. These include instances of crucial derivation rules such as: (R1) p, 
p → q ๹ q, (R2) ∼q, p → q ๹ ∼p and (R3) p ∨ q, ∼p ๹ q.
Now consider clause (ii). Let us begin with the intended interpretation of probabili-
ties. The probabilities here are meant to be objective. That is, probability statements are 
meant to indicate true relative frequencies and/or true propensities of things happening 
like events, states-of-affairs or property instantiations. An objective interpretation captures 
the earlier intuition that the confirmational disconnectedness or connectedness of the con-
tent of a hypothesis is determined by facts about the world. It is not a subjective matter. At 
this stage, we put aside worries about our epistemic access to objective probabilities, though 
we return to this issue in Section 7.
The notion of probabilistic independence employed in clause (ii) is meant to help us 
scoop up additional ways through which two propositions fail to be confirmationally con-
nected. The first kind of confirmational connection we encountered was in the form of 
a (relevant) deductive link. Sometimes such a connection may be absent, as required by 
clause (i), but another one may be present in the form of a probabilistic link. To ensure 
that there is no probabilistic link between any pair α, β we require that such pairs are prob-
abilistically independent. That means that the probability of the one is unrelated to the 
probability of the other. And, if that is the case, then we cannot possibly argue that the two 
propositions are confirmationally connected.
What I just said is not quite right. To secure confirmational disconnectedness be-
tween a pair of propositions A, B at the probabilistic level we must inspect not only the 
total content of each proposition but also the content of their parts. After all, two propo-
sitions may have consequences that are probabilistically dependent even though the prop-
ositions themselves are probabilistically independent. That’s why we rummage through all 
the possible pairs of relevant deductive consequences of each in our evaluations.7 
6 This is not an appeal to relevant logic which axiomatises the notion of relevance. Rather, it is a restric-
tion of the kinds of inferences that are allowed within the framework of classical deductive logic. The 
special turnstile “๹r”is no more than a short-hand way of referring to the latter. 
7 The condition that P(α), P(β) > 0 reflects the common practice of assigning a non-zero value to false-
propositions to avoid undefinability. The condition that P(α), P(β) < 1 is not strictly necessary. Take a 
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Finally consider clause (iii). This clause is meant to scoop up residual ways through 
which two propositions fail to be confirmationally connected. Two propositions A, B 
may satisfy clauses (i) and (ii) and yet still be confirmationally connected. What form do 
these connections take? As a first approximation, the kind of connection I have in mind is 
through a proposition δ that is a relevant deductive consequence of α ∧ β but is not a rel-
evant deductive consequence of either α or β when each is considered on its own. The first 
thing to note is that this sort of situation would not even be possible if we did not filter out 
irrelevant deductive consequences. That’s because classical deductive logic allows the deriva-
tion of (p → r) ∨ (q → r) from (p ∧ q) → r. But it seems obvious that there are states of af-
fairs where the presence of two conditions is sufficient to bring about an event even though 
the presence of each condition on its own is insufficient to do so. If we want our logic to cap-
ture such states of affairs, derivations like the above must not be allowed. Thankfully, the re-
striction to relevant deductive consequences rules them out as irrelevant - see D3.
A second thing to note is that if clause (iii) required only that there is no δ that any α, 
β jointly (but not individually) and relevantly entail then the concept of disconnectedness 
would once again be rendered unsatisfiable.8 In other words, there would always be such a δ 
regardless of the content α, β are allowed by the clause to possess. One such δ, for example, 
is α ∧ β. To rule out such guaranteed joint consequences I first considered turning to the 
notion of relevant deductive content elements, originally proposed by Schurz (1991). I now 
believe that this notion, though instructive in its general spirit, is inadequate for the task at 
hand. Here’s why. First off, let us consider what’s packed into the notion. A proposition 
ψ is a relevant deductive content element of a proposition φ if, and only if, ψ is a relevant 
consequence of φ and ψ cannot be decomposed into a logically equivalent conjunction of 
propositions, each of which has less content than ψ. Intuitively speaking, a relevant deduc-
tive content element is a proposition whose content cannot be decomposed into smaller 
content parts. How does this help rule out guaranteed joint consequences like α ∧ β? Well, 
a proposition δ that is a relevant deductive content element of α ∧ β could not be logically 
equivalent to α ∧ β since that would mean that the content of both α, β is smaller compared 
to that of δ. Note, moreover, that all conjunctive relevant consequences of α ∧ β that have 
less content than α ∧ β (and that are not relevant consequences of α or β on their own) are 
also ruled out for the same reasons, as they should be since they are also guaranteed to exist.
Despite appearances to the contrary, the notion of relevant deductive content ele-
ments is not fully fit for the job. This needs some explaining. A supposition sometimes 
made in the metaphysics literature (e.g. Armstrong 1989), one that I also share, is that the 
world has atomic states. The universe could not instantiate any part of such a state with-
out instantiating the whole state for the simple reason that, provided this supposition 
holds, the state has no smaller parts. The notion of a content element might be thought of 
as the conceptual analogue of an atomic state. But immediately there is a problem. Con-
ceivability is a radically unrestrained tool. Take a proposition ψ1 describing an atomic 
case where P(α) = 1 and/or P(β) = 1. Such an assignment guarantees that P(α/β) = P(α) regardless of 
the specific content of either proposition. It would thus seem to offhandedly rule out any connection 
between them. It is unnecessary to demand that P(α), P(β) < 1 because any connection between such 
propositions, i.e. where P(α) = 1 and/or P(β) = 1, would at any case be deductive and hence capturable 
by the other two clauses in the definition of confirmational connectedness.
8 Note that where α ∧ β ๹r δ, α ๿r δ and β ๿r δ , α and β cannot have the same content.
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state. Nothing prevents us from conceiving a decomposition of ψ1 into a logically equiva-
lent conjunctive proposition where each conjunct has less content than ψ1. The claim is 
not that conceptually-driven decomposition is limitless. Rather the claim is that if there is 
such a limit it need not, and in fact it is not likely, to coincide with the limit of a decom-
position which is solely determined by the amount of content required to represent an 
atomic state. That’s why appeal is made to the notion of atomic propositions instead of to 
the notion of content elements. The general motivation behind this move is to let atomic 
states dictate the amount of content that atomic propositions possess. A proposition ψ is 
atomic if, and only if, ψ is non-superfluous and truthfully represents all and only the con-
tent of an atomic state. Such a proposition does not permit any conjunctively atomic non-
superfluous decompositions, i.e. a decomposition of ψ into n propositions ω1, ..., ωn where 
n ≥ 2 such that ψ ๹r ω1 ∧ ... ∧ ωn and each ωi represents all and only the content of a dis-
tinct atomic state. Thus, the ability to rule out guaranteed joint consequences is preserved.
Allow me to bring this section to a close by pointing out that the foregoing discussion 
links up nicely with one of the burning issues in confirmation theory, namely how support 
gets transmitted. On the one hand, it might be argued that simply being a content part of a 
hypothesis or of a set of hypotheses means that evidence for the truth of one part is automat-
ically transmitted to all the other parts. Such a globally holistic account surely can’t be right 
as it would lead us straight into the clutches of the tacking paradox. On the other hand, it 
might be argued that only direct support for a content part is genuine. This is denigratingly 
described as ‘content-cutting’ by Ken Gemes (1998). Such a globally anti-holistic account 
counters the very idea of induction since the transmission of support is strictly prohibited. 
Take the general hypothesis ‘Objects with mass bend space-time around them’. On such a 
globally anti-holistic view, any evidence of massive objects bending space-time around them 
would be strictly limited in its support to those parts of the general hypothesis that concern 
the given objects. This means, among other things, that no such evidence would be capable 
of supporting the hypothesis that ‘The next observed object with mass will bend space-time 
around it’. Indeed, the contradictory hypothesis, i.e. ‘It is not the case that the next observed 
object with mass will bend space-time around it’, would according to this view be deemed to 
be confirmationally on the same footing. Surely such judgments are incorrect.
If the truth cannot be found at either of these two extremes, it must lie somewhere in 
between. That’s where my account slots in. It asserts that evidence for one content part will 
not indiscriminately spread to another content part but that spreading sometimes takes 
place. Whether or not it does depends on the confirmational connections between content 
parts in the terms specified by the aforementioned clauses. And that, as I have already re-
peatedly stressed, cannot be decided in an a priori fashion but is a matter of whether or not 
corresponding connections exist in the world.9
5. Monstrousness: A Measure
A non-self-contradictory molecular proposition Δ is monstrous if, and only if, some of its 
content parts are confirmationally disconnected. What does molecular mean? It means 
9 As things stand in my account, such connections need not be causal.
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that its content can be decomposed into a conjunction whose conjuncts include at least 
two distinct atomic propositions. The reason for this requirement is that if Δ were an 
atomic or even a sub-atomic proposition it would not have enough content to allow us 
to make the sort of judgments about it we’d like to make, e.g. whether there is an atomic 
proposition δ such that α ∧ β ๹r δ, α ๿r δ and β ๿r δ where, of course, α and β are content 
parts of Δ. Note also that although the analysandum makes reference to an individual 
proposition, e.g. a hypothesis, we can still use it to pass judgment on the monstrousness 
of two or more propositions, e.g. two or more hypotheses, so long as these are mutually 
consistent. To achieve this we just need to form a conjunction that takes each distinct 
proposition as a conjunct. That conjunction then constitutes our individual proposition 
Δ. Henceforth, and unless otherwise noted, whenever I speak of a proposition (or a hy-
pothesis) Δ I will mean either a natively individual one or one that we constructed as an 
individual from a number of others.
Most hypotheses we encounter in science probably contain at least some disconnected 
parts and hence are monstrous to some extent. It is thus not enough to say that a hypothesis 
is monstrous. We must also find a way to gauge the extent of that monstrousness. That is, we 
need to put forth a monstrousness measure. Let us start with an informal characterisation: 
The degree of monstrousness of a proposition Δ is given by the ratio of the sum of discon-
nected pairs of its parts to the sum of the total number of pairs of its parts, i.e. connected and 
disconnected. In both cases, these sums are computed on the basis of all distinct ways of dis-
tributing the total content of Δ into parts. To give an example of two distinct distributions: 
Δ may be distributed into propositions A, B where A: ζ1 ∧ ζ2 ∧ ζ3 and B: ξ1 and Δ may be dis-
tributed into propositions A’, B’ where A’: ζ2 ∧ ζ3 and B’: ξ1 ∧ ζ1. Why compute monstrous-
ness on the basis of all distinct ways of distributing the total content of Δ? Because different 
ways of distributing that content can have an effect on its degree of monstrousness. To neu-
tralise this problem we avoid arbitrarily choosing one such distribution over all others and 
instead take all of them into account. Thus, any whiff of arbitrariness disappears and we can-
not even be accused of leaving any one distribution out - without a vote so-to-speak.
Formally, the extent of the monstrousness μ of a proposition Δ is given by the follow-
ing function:
µ(∆)= diα ,β
i=1
n
∑ tiα ,β
i=1
n
∑
where diα,β denotes the number of disconnected pairs α, β in a given content distribution i, 
tiα,β denotes the total number of connected plus disconnected pairs α, β in a given distribu-
tion i and n denotes the total number of content distributions. To determine the number 
of disconnected pairs in a given content distribution we count how many times a differ-
ent pair of relevant deductive consequences α, β turns out to satisfy clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) 
simultaneously.10 Any pair that is not disconnected is counted as connected. The higher 
(/lower) the value of μ(Δ) the more (/less) monstrous the content of Δ.
 10  The emphasis on different pairs is meant to rule out counting a pair more than once within a given 
content distribution. Thus, if α1: φ, β1: ψ, α2: ψ, β2: φ, we evaluate either pair α1, β1 or pair α2, β2 but 
not both.
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It is important to note that μ is only intended as a provisional measure of the con-
trived-ness of hypotheses. That is to say, I am fully aware that this proposal needs revi-
sions.11 Even so, I consider it a solid first step in the right direction. One major advantage 
is that the measure is purely objective since its output is entirely dependent on the notions 
of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness, themselves wholly determined 
by facts about the world such as the true relative frequencies and/or true propensities of 
events, states-of-affairs, properties, etc. Another major advantage is its wide-ranging ap-
plicability. The account doesn’t place any debilitating restrictions on propositions Δ. As a 
result, the said propositions can be drawn from a large pool of entries, which includes cen-
tral hypotheses, auxiliaries, explanantia and explananda. This not only allows us to gauge 
the monstrousness of the most commonly touted relations, e.g. the relation between a cen-
tral hypothesis and an auxiliary hypothesis or the relation between an explanans and an ex-
planandum, but also of any other relation we can think of, e.g. the relation between one 
auxiliary hypothesis and another.
6. Unification as Inverted Monstrousness*
If the monstrousness measure does indeed capture the degree to which the content of 
a hypothesis is contrived, artificially put together or forcibly united, then it is not un-
reasonable to expect that the less monstrous a hypothesis the more unified its content. 
That is, unification may be understood as the inverse of monstrousness. Well, not ex-
actly… We first need to tweak the notion of monstrousness and its associated measure. 
That’s because there is one kind of confirmational connectedness that is neither here nor 
there in cases of unification, namely that conveyed by clause (1). This clause gets acti-
vated when two content parts share content. But sharing content is a trivial way of unify-
ing. Suppose a given pair α1, β1 is such that α1: φ and β1: φ where φ is a true or partly true 
proposition. This ensures the satisfaction of clause (1) as there is a true or partly true 
proposition γ such that α1 ๹r γ and β1 ๹r γ and hence α1 and β1 are confirmationally con-
nected. But surely unifying requires bringing together content, not repeating it. The first 
thing to do then is to drop clauses (1) and (i) from their respective notions. Moreover, it 
is important to explicitly forbid content duplication across a pair α, β, i.e. at the level of 
a pair’s joint content α ∧ β, by introducing an external non-superfluous-ness qualifica-
tion. That’s because such content duplication adversely affects our evaluations through 
the remaining clauses. Take, for example, clause (2). Without the aforesaid qualification, 
we would be allowed to compare α1 and β1 but these turn out to be confirmationally con-
nected: P(α1/β1) ≠ P(α1) since P(φ/φ) = 1 and P(φ) < 1. But, as already mentioned, we 
want to avoid such trivial ways of unifying. Hence the appeal to the external non-super-
fluous-ness qualification.
Let us call the revised notion ‘confirmational connectedness*’. It can be expressed as 
follows:
11  I can already foresee problems that demand the modification of some of the things I said. Alas, there is 
no time or space to develop them here.
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Any two content parts of a non-self-contradictory proposition Γ expressed as propo-
sitions A, B are confirmationally connected* if, and only if, for some pair of internally and 
externally non-superfluous propositions α, β where A ๹r α and B ๹r β: either (1’) where 
0 < P(α), P(β) < 1, P(α/β) ≠ P(α) or (2’) there is at least one atomic proposition δ such 
that α ∧ β ๹r δ, α ๿r δ and β ๿r δ. 
Mutatis mutandis, we can obtain the correlative notion of confirmational disconnected-
ness*. On the basis of these two notions we can assert that a non-self-contradictory mo-
lecular proposition Δ is monstrous* if, and only if, some of its content parts are confirma-
tionally disconnected*. Finally, we can revise our monstrousness measure in light of the 
above alterations. Thus, μ*(Δ) is almost exactly like μ(Δ), the only difference being that 
the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness are replaced by the 
notions of confirmational connectedness* and disconnectedness*. We are now ready to 
express the unification u of a proposition Δ with the following function:
u(Δ) = 1 – μ*(Δ)
Of central importance here is the fact that the objectivity of the monstrousness* meas-
ure carries over to the unification measure since the latter is advanced as the inverse of the 
former. In other words, the objectivity of the unification measure is guaranteed by the fact 
that its output is entirely dependent on the notions of confirmational connectedness* and 
disconnectedness*. Whether these notions are satisfied for any given pair of propositions 
is, as we have already witnessed, a matter wholly determined by the way the world is like. 
Herein lies the greatest strength of this approach. The world itself decides what is physi-
cally connected to what, in what way and to what degree. In short, unification, under the 
proposed measure, is not in the eye of the beholder.
Let us motivate this relation between monstrousness* and unification with some exam-
ples. Take a true hypothesis that conjoins propositions expressing disparate facts:
H1: q1 is a black raven on Earth ∧ q2 is a decaying particle on Jupiter ∧ ... ∧ qn is an 
exploding neutron star.
Such a hypothesis should come out as highly disunified.
Is this what our measure tells us? That sure seems so. There are presumably very few, if 
any, confirmational connections* between the different conjuncts. That’s because there 
are presumably very few real world connections between the expressed facts. For example, 
whether or not q1 is a black raven on Earth is presumably probabilistically independent of 
whether or not q2 is a decaying particle on Jupiter. Thus, were we to go through our calcu-
lations, H1 would get a high monstrousness* and hence a low unification score. And that’s 
precisely what one would expect from such an obviously disunified hypothesis. Compare 
H1 to the following true hypothesis that conjoins propositions expressing related facts:
H2: r1 is a black raven ∧ r2 is a black raven ∧ ... ∧ rm is a black raven.
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There are presumably very many confirmational connections* between its conjuncts. 
That’s because there are presumably very many real world connections between the ex-
pressed facts. One systematic confirmational connection* that holds between all pairs of 
conjuncts is through the following proposition:
R1: There are at least two black ravens.
Note that R1 is not a relevant deductive consequence of any given individual conjunct belong-
ing to H2. But it is a relevant deductive consequence of any pairing of conjuncts, e.g. r1 is a black 
raven ∧ r2 is a black raven or r1 is a black raven ∧ r3 is a black raven. Now R1 is clearly not an 
atomic proposition but, by that very fact, at least one of its content parts is an atomic proposi-
tion. Let us denote any such content part as follows: R1c. We have just established that between 
all such pairs of conjuncts there is always a proposition δ, namely R1c, exactly as demanded by 
condition (2’) in the characterisation of confirmational connectedness*. That is to say, these 
conjuncts are systematically confirmationally connected*. Thus, were we to run through our 
calculations, H2 would get a very low monstrousness* and hence a very high unification score.
So far, so good! Now consider a slight peculiarity. H2 would not get a lower unification 
score when compared to a statement expressing the same content in a condensed form:
H3: Ravens r1 to rm are black.
Critics may find this consequence unacceptable. Such critics would be particularly aggravated 
in the case where we compare a universally quantified statement, e.g. all ravens are black, to a 
logically equivalent long conjunction, e.g. r1 is a black raven ∧ r2 is a black raven ∧ ... ∧ rn is a 
black raven ∧ nothing else is a raven.12 They might argue that a universally quantified state-
ment brings out the unity of the content much more than a long conjunction and hence de-
serves to be awarded a higher unification score. I would now like to put this view to rest. It 
should be clear that one formulation could not be more confirmed than the other, for the 
simple reason that they both express the same content. That is to say, without a difference 
in content there cannot be a confirmational difference. But, if all that matters in judging the 
unity of a hypothesis are these confirmational minutiae, as I have been suggesting with my 
notions of confirmationally (dis-/)connectedness*, then it should also be clear that one for-
mulation could not be more unified than the other. In other words, how the same content is 
sheathed should have no effect on its unification score. The measure of unification proposed 
above respects this point. It respects it by computing a unification score on the basis of all dis-
tinct ways of distributing some content into parts. Since the two formulations express the 
same content they have all and only the same content distributions. But that just means that 
they are equally connected* and hence equally unified.
I would like to draw this section to a close with an admittedly cursory discussion of a 
historical example. Fresnel’s equations for the reflection and transmission of light are de-
rivable from Maxwell’s theory of electro-magnetism. The latter is famous for having uni-
fied the behaviour of all sorts of phenomena. Visible light, according to this theory, is but a 
12  An unresolved puzzle is how to deal with the conjunct ‘nothing else is a raven’. One intuition is to ex-
clude such conjuncts from monstrousness* and unification evaluations. 
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specific kind of electro-magnetic wave or radiation. The very fact that visible light satisfies 
the same well-confirmed equations as other kinds of electro-magnetic radiation, e.g. radio 
waves, means that Maxwell’s theory makes substantial strides in unifying its content. The 
unification exhibited in this case is unification in its purest form: Various phenomena un-
der study are treated as instances of the same regularity. What does our account say about 
this sort of case? Well, among other things, the fact that all kinds of electro-magnetic radia-
tion satisfy the same equations means that there is a true or at least partly true proposition 
corresponding to each instance of this regularity, e.g. m1: ‘E1 is an electromagnetic wave sat-
isfying Maxwell’s equations’, m2: ‘E2 is an electromagnetic wave satisfying Maxwell’s equa-
tions’, etc. But now note that, when conjoined, any two such propositions relevantly entail 
a third, namely ‘There are at least two electromagnetic waves satisfying Maxwell’s equa-
tions’, that neither relevantly entails on its own. This last proposition is molecular. There-
fore, at least one of its content parts is atomic. Call the atomic part R2c. All such pairings of 
conjuncts like m1 ∧ m2 relevantly entail an atomic proposition δ, namely R2c, exactly as de-
manded by condition (2’). In other words, these conjuncts are systematically confirmation-
ally connected*. And that demonstrates one of the ways in which the content of Maxwell’s 
theory is unified.
7. Practicability
I already pointed out that the current view’s greatest strength is that it hitches a ride on the 
objective notions of confirmational connectedness* and disconnectedness*. That same ride 
also proves to be its greatest weakness. Even when we seek to compare two propositions 
whose content is relatively small, a great number of objective probabilities need to be taken 
into account. Since we have at best limited access to such probabilities the proposed meas-
ure is severely handicapped in its practicability.
Three points help mitigate the despair caused by this objection. The first concerns the 
proper aim of this essay. That aim was to propose an objective conception and measure of 
unification whose judgments accord well with clear cases of unified and disunified hypoth-
eses. There was never an aspiration to provide a measure of unification that is fully practi-
cable. Perhaps we cannot have a fully objective and fully practicable measure of unification. 
If the keys to unification are indeed the notions of confirmational connectedness* and dis-
connectedness* and these notions need to be spelt out in more or less the way they have 
been above then we might just have to live with a fully objective but less-than-fully prac-
ticable measure. If that were the case, people would then be free to choose between such a 
measure and less-than-fully objective ones that may be fully practicable.
The second point picks up from where the first one left off. There is no question of the 
measure being completely impracticable. We needn’t have access to a complete score to get 
a good sense of which of two hypotheses is the more unified. As the examples above show, 
all sorts of information is accessible and can help make that judgement. This includes in-
formation about the relevant deductive relations between different content parts. For ex-
ample, we know that each conjoined pair of H2’s conjuncts entails R1c. That’s sufficient to 
indicate a systematic confirmational connection* between the hypothesis’ content parts. In 
other words, although these judgments may in some cases be more uncertain than others, 
the measure does not leave us completely in the dark.
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The third and final point concerns the complexity of the measure. At present, getting the 
measure to yield a complete score involves a complex calculation requiring copious amounts 
of information, not all of which, as we have already seen, is readily available or even accessible. 
But what if there was a way to simplify the measure without sacrificing too much of what it 
tries to track. One idea potentially worth pursuing is to run computer simulations on all sorts 
of environments where the ‘real world’ connections are stipulated in advance. We can then 
check under what conditions more simplistic measures yield similar judgments to our pro-
posed measure. It might turn out, for example, that for the kinds of conditions that are simi-
lar to those usually encountered in the real world it is more often than not sufficient to com-
pute unification scores on the basis of very limited information. The measure proposed in this 
essay could thus act as a lighthouse, helping to guide the construction of another measure, one 
that is more, and perhaps even fully, practicable. Alas, though it may make for a good sequel 
essay, this idea is not one that I can pursue further here.
8. A Word on Coherence
When I first started digging into the unification literature I was almost instantly led to the 
related literature on coherence. The latter notion is traditionally, and very roughly, under-
stood as a relation of ‘agreement’ or ‘mutual support’ between testimonies, beliefs, memo-
ries, propositions, etc. (Olsson 2005, Ch 2). There are clearly similarities between my uni-
fication project and various projects that seek to understand coherence, not least of which 
are the probabilistic relations of support that both attempt to lean on. The two projects 
may have much in common but they are not the selfsame. Accounts of coherence stress the 
importance of rewarding content duplication. That is, the more content gets duplicated 
the higher the coherence. As Olsson notes, “Now if [testimonial agreement and, in particu-
lar, testifying the same proposition] is not a case of coherence, then, I must confess, I have 
no idea of what that notion could possibly involve... Testimonial agreement is more than 
just coherent; it is very coherent” (p. 16). Indeed, he goes on to fortify this idea: “... the de-
gree of coherence equals 1 if and only if P(A ∧ B) = P(A ∨ B), i.e. just in case A and B coin-
cide” (p. 99). By contrast, accounts of unification like the one presented above ignore con-
tent duplication.13 That’s because, intuitively, to unify is to bring together things that are 
at least in some minimal respect distinct. To conclude, insofar as the projects of unification 
and coherence overlap I very much hope that any contributions made in this essay shed 
light not only on the coveted notion of unification but also on the equally coveted notion 
of coherence.
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